

# Secretary Rusk's News Conference of February 1

THE NEW YORK TIMES

Secretary of State Dean Rusk made a brief statement at the beginning of an editorial session he received from friends in Canada on account of the press conference he gave in Washington. There is a strong possibility of further such editorial sessions and one of editorial criticism for a misunderstanding of this conference. I say to all Canadians that we neither in this world of ours nor in the next want to give offense, but we need to make the clarifying statement in order to straighten out the thinking.

It became necessary, as the result of statements made in the course of editorial sessions last week. Without going to us—and we understand how this can happen in the heat of debate—there was a misreading of confidential exchanges between our two Governments, and a number of arguments were put forward by various speakers which appeared to offer new interpretations of the policies of the United States.

As a result, a number of questions were raised with our Government by Canadian and American reporters, by Members of our Congress, and by ordinary citizens. It became clear that we should have to give some account of our own views. This question, after all, is one which involves the legitimate concerns of both our peoples. Our common effort for the defense of North America and our partnership in NATO necessarily involve us all. Yet we were well aware of the fact that these issues are politically very sensitive in Canada, and we did not wish to engage in discussion at a level which would seem to imply criticism of any individual or group from any leading officer of our Government. Neither did we believe that a diplomatic protest was appropriate. Such a protest indeed might have been called interference

in the light of the bilateral nature of the initial discussion of our talks had occurred.

We are determined on a simple statement of the facts as we understand them. I have already expressed my regret if our news was wrong, but I believe the facts of the position as we understand them were fairly set out. If obviously if the statement contains errors, we shall be prompt to correct them.

It should be clear to all North Americans that of course all final decisions about nuclear weapons in our common defense are for the United States and we in the United States must carry too well that decisions about nuclear defense are particularly testing and painful. We will always respect the open decisions of the Soviet Union about our policies as well as our own open decisions, and we shall continue to believe that in the long run the friendship of our two peoples, which we value so highly, can only be maintained but requires open and clear discussions on great common problems.

## Soviet Suspension of Test Ban Talks

I should also like to comment informally on the suspension of the nuclear test discussions pending the return to the Geneva Conference in about 10 days' time.

It is always difficult to understand what is in the mind of the other side in a discussion of this sort, and I am sure that there will be considerable speculation as to why the Soviet Union suspended the present discussions. I am inclined to believe that if there is a simple and sufficient answer, we should concentrate on that, even though there could be other factors in the situation.

The basic position of the Soviet Union seems

<sup>1</sup> For a statement of Jan. 31 by William C. Foster, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, see p. 236.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 243.

## Breakdown in Negotiations on U.S. - Cuban Ship in LEO

WASHINGTON, Feb. 15 (AP)—President Kennedy today said the United States has broken off negotiations with the Soviet Union over the release of a U.S. ship held in Cuba. The President said the negotiations had broken down because the Soviet Union would not agree to release the ship unless the United States agreed to a general reduction of nuclear weapons. The President said the United States would not agree to such a reduction unless the Soviet Union agreed to release the ship. The President said the United States would not agree to such a reduction unless the Soviet Union agreed to release the ship. The President said the United States would not agree to such a reduction unless the Soviet Union agreed to release the ship.

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These talks were the first since the U.S. and the Soviet Union agreed to a general reduction of nuclear weapons. The President said the United States would not agree to such a reduction unless the Soviet Union agreed to release the ship. The President said the United States would not agree to such a reduction unless the Soviet Union agreed to release the ship. The President said the United States would not agree to such a reduction unless the Soviet Union agreed to release the ship.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, did you hear that statement?*  
*A. Yes, sir.*  
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*Q. The President did not say that statement.*  
*A. That's right, sir.*

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of the fact that the test ban talks in New York have been...*

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### Soviet Military Presence in Cuba

*Q. Mr. Secretary, when there was last August...*

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## Statement by President Kennedy

<sup>1</sup> For background, see *Reviews of Vol. 11* (1993), p. 198.

### Situation in Viet-Nam

A. I think in a situation such as we have in VI. Nam, at any one time there are going to be both plus's and minuses in the situation. There is no more difficult, disagreeable, and frustrating type of operation, than those that

### Soviet Position on Nuclear Testing

10. If the State is to have a right to take the property of its citizens, it must first test the theory that the State is entitled to exercise the power of eminent domain in its own right, and only if it is found to be the possessor of the State's power of eminent domain, may it be permitted to exercise the power of eminent domain in its own right.

I would like to add that 85 per cent of the problem relates to the Central Bureau as of late I just informed the Government on this question of what each of the heads must be stating, given the differences between two positions, the Soviets may have been on the inspection is unnecessary to



order of 10 free-world ships in the Cuban trade. I think in January there was something less than 10, and most or a good many of those were on long-term charter from free-world flag countries to bloc enterprises. So there are points at which the attitude of the hemisphere and the free world toward Cuba has been having a very practical effect.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you have any indication from the American industry or elsewhere to which will be a practical indication as to whether or not there are on-site inspections anticipated?*

A. No. We ourselves do not have, and I do not see any early prospect of having, instrumentation which would clearly distinguish between on- and underground nuclear explosions and natural causes of earthquakes. It is true that we learned a great deal during the 1964 year about how we might, in fact, distinguish such events and get some improvement in our ability to distinguish between earthquakes and underground tests, but we do not see in the immediate prospect the technical capability of doing this job without actual on-site inspection.

Again, I repeat that if the Soviet Union has such a capability—and a country which put two astronauts within a few miles of each other in outer space may have such capability as far as we know—we have not seen the instruments, and we have not seen any technical demonstration of that capacity.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, does the post-1964 test thinking include any proposal to add political functions to the existing Western European union?*

A. I have heard that suggestion come from across the Atlantic, but I don't believe that has come up for any intergovernmental conversations at this point. I am not aware of it.

*Q. Sir, at the point of adjournment from Geneva there was some speculation that there might be more hope returning on peripheral issues, apart from the test ban, such as the communication between Moscow and Washington. Do you have any hope that this may turn out to be the area of advance when you go back to Geneva?*

A. Our recent discussions have concentrated on the nuclear test issue and have not gotten into any of these other questions. But we would be surprised if it would be possible to take issue of the importance of these central and important issues and not say they get so far off on the perimeter that any agreement there would be of no real consequence. A nuclear test ban agreement would be a matter of real importance.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, on the matter of aid to the Third World, are you willing to call to aid our influence in the Third World with the emphasis on making it to be fruit?*

A. We have been emphasizing in terms of development the building on which an assistance program is being made from day to day, and the nations themselves.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you have mentioned that the President has asked whether or not he should talk to the Soviet Union "on the line" for tests being made. Is this not the matter which from the time you took office in 1961 [1962] when he met Khrushchev?*

A. No, I don't have any understanding that the President was directing that the preparations for that be resumed, and I don't know that I can or should elaborate that at this point.

#### Nuclear Testing by Other Countries

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you are asked a rather question, and we tell us whether the question of French and Chinese nuclear testing are discussed with all the Russians and, if so, in what context?*

A. I think that in all of these discussions over the years on this matter the Soviets on their side said that they would hope and expect that France would sign such an agreement, and we ourselves have expressed our own concern that any other country, such as China, might initiate nuclear testing, so that this has been a subject that has been a part of the discussion from the beginning.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, there are those in the past week who have sought to portray the policies that the French are following in Europe as far-*